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ABSTRACT 
Using a sample of dividend payers from 12 European countries, we document that managers 
guide analyst dividend expectations to avoid reporting dividends below the consensus forecast. 
Specifically, we show that dividend guidance predicts (1) a substantial reduction in analyst 
dividend forecast optimism over the course of the fiscal year and (2) that a firm will meet or beat 
the consensus dividend forecast by a small margin. Managers guide analyst dividend 
expectations to avoid negative price reactions when reporting negative dividend surprises. Our 
results, which are robust to endogeneity and self-selection concerns and control for 
contemporaneous earnings guidance, highlight the important role dividend guidance plays in 
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The dividend signaling model of Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985) and Miller and 
Rock (1985) predicts that when investors are less informed, dividends convey information about 
firm prospects. Importantly, the model anticipates that negative dividend surprises associate with 
strong negative price reactions.1 If investors penalize firms for missing dividend expectations, 
managers have the incentive to provide dividend guidance to avoid announcing disappointing 
dividend news, a premise we examine in this study. We focus on analyst dividend expectations 
because (1) past studies document that firms provide guidance specifically to influence analyst 
expectations (Richardson et al., 2004; Cotter et al., 2006; Feng and McVay, 2010) and (2) 
investors rely on analyst forecasts rather than time series estimates in forming expectations of 
firm results (Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Bartov et al., 2002; 
Bilinski and Bradshaw, 2016).2  
 To answer the research question, we collect a sample of dividend payers from 12 
European countries. We focus on Europe because the majority of European firms pay dividends 
(Hail et al., 2014; Fatemi and Bildik, 2012), hence European firms have the incentive to issue 
explicit dividend guidance.3 To make cross-country comparisons meaningful, we focus on 
annualized analyst dividend forecasts because (1) most firms in Europe pay annual dividends 
(Ferris et al., 2010), (2) the majority of previous studies examine annual dividend 
                                                          
1 We use the terms “surprise” and “news” interchangeably to denote new information revealed at dividend or 
earnings announcements.  
2 Past studies frequently find no support for the dividend signaling model when dividend expectations are based on 
time-series forecasts (e.g., Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Benartzi et al., 1997; Conroy et al., 2000; Fukuda, 2000; 
Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Andres et al., 2013). In contrast, when expectations are based on analyst dividend 
forecasts, Andres et al. (2013) and Bilinski and Bradshaw (2016) find support for the signaling role of dividends.  
3 Few firms in the U.S. pay dividends, and the number of U.S.  dividend payers has significantly declined over time 
(Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo et al., 2004, 2008). To illustrate, Fatemi and Bildik (2012) examine dividend 
payers in a sample of 33 countries over the period 1985–2006. They report that more than 61% of listed firms in 
Europe versus 28% in the U.S. paid dividends in 2006. This result suggests that dividends are important for the 
majority of listed European firms. The declining propensity to issue dividends suggests low incentives to provide 
dividend guidance. Consistently, we find that less than 0.01% of firm-years for U.S. dividend payers have 
management dividend guidance. 
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announcements (Lonie et al., 1996; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1990 and DeAngelo et al., 2004), 
and (3) the literature review in DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) highlights that the dividend 
policy is most often determined at fiscal year-end. As we focus on dividend announcements, our 
conclusions are unaffected by the frequency of subsequent dividend payments.  
As a first test, we examine changes in the properties of analyst dividend forecasts that 
previous studies attribute to guidance (Matsumoto, 2002; Richardson et al., 2004; Cotter et al., 
2006). Specifically, we look at walkdown in analyst dividend expectations, which we measure by 
changes in dividend forecast bias. We document that analysts tend to issue optimistic dividend 
forecasts early in the fiscal year and that managers walk down analyst dividend expectations over 
the course of the fiscal year. In particular, we find that the initial optimism in analyst dividend 
forecasts declines from 0.15% in the first fiscal quarter to 0.01% in the fourth quarter and that 
the majority of firms meet or beat the analyst consensus dividend forecast at dividend 
announcements. Furthermore, we report that the proportion of firms that meet or beat the 
consensus dividend forecast is higher than the proportion of firms that meet or beat the 
consensus earnings forecast. This result is consistent with the comparatively higher market 
penalty for reporting negative dividend than earnings news (Dielman and Oppenheimer, 1984; 
Kothari et al., 2009; Bilinski and Bradshaw, 2016). As an additional test, we document a 
discontinuity in dividend surprises around zero and that a disproportionate number of firms beat 
the consensus dividend forecast by a small margin. In particular, the proportion of firms that beat 
the consensus dividend forecast by a small margin is almost five times higher than the fraction of 
firms that beat the consensus earnings forecast by a small margin. This result echoes higher 
firms’ incentives to meet analyst dividend than earnings expectations due to a higher penalty for 
failing to meet analyst dividend consensus. Jointly, our initial results are consistent with firms 
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endeavoring to meet or beat the consensus dividend forecast and avoid reporting negative 
dividend news.  
To formalize the analysis and show a direct link between guidance and changes in the 
properties of analyst dividend forecasts, we define an indicator variable for whether a firm issued 
dividend guidance during a fiscal year. We document that management dividend forecasts are 
available for 58% of firm-years for firms that provide management forecasts. We then examine if 
dividend guidance helps walk down analyst dividend expectations. Specifically, we create an 
indicator variable for at least a 50% reduction in dividend forecast optimism in the fourth 
compared to the first quarter (significant DPS reduction) and an indicator variable for a firm 
meeting or beating the consensus dividend forecast by a small margin (DPS barely beat). 
Regression results show a statistically and economically significant association between 
significant DPS reduction and DPS barely beat and a dummy for whether the firm provided 
dividend guidance. Specifically, dividend guidance increases the likelihood of a significant 
reduction in analyst dividend forecast optimism by 6.9%, and it raises the probability a firm will 
meet or beat the analyst dividend consensus by a small margin by 13.2%. This evidence suggests 
that dividend guidance helps walk down analyst dividend expectations to beatable levels.   
To address the concern our results capture cases when both dividend guidance and 
reduction in analyst dividend forecast optimism are driven by the same unobservable factors, we 
perform two tests. First, we use instrumental variables regression to address the endogeneity 
concern. As an instrument, we use the fraction of firms that provide dividend guidance in the 
company’s industry in the previous fiscal year. We expect that a firm will be more likely to 
engage in dividend guidance when a larger proportion of its peers guide analyst forecasts. 
However, past peer guidance should not affect the magnitude of a reduction in analyst dividend 
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forecast optimism or the likelihood the firm will meet the analyst dividend consensus by a small 
margin. Thus, the instrument meets both the exclusion restriction and the relevance condition. 
Instrumental regression results produce evidence consistent with our main conclusions. The 
second test repeats our analysis after including firm effects. Firm effects capture unobserved 
firm-level characteristics that can correlate with changes in properties of analyst dividend 
forecasts and the dividend guidance indicator. Regression results with firm effects are 
qualitatively similar to our main results.  
There is a concern that our conclusions are affected by selectivity in analyst stock 
coverage (Rajan and Servaes, 1997) because, on average, 62% of dividend payers in the 
Compustat Global universe have analyst coverage. We address this concern in two ways. First, 
we repeat the analysis for fiscal years 2010–2013, in which over 87% of dividend payers have 
analyst coverage and find consistent results. Second, we repeat the analysis for the quintile of 
stocks with the highest institutional ownership in which analyst coverage choices are 
constrained. The intuition for this test is that brokers routinely cover stocks with large 
institutional holdings because sell-side analysts are compensated out of trade commissions and 
commission fees increase with the size of institutional ownership (Irvine, 2004). Consistent with 
this prediction, 80% of stocks in the highest institutional ownership quintile are covered by 
analysts as opposed to a 28% coverage for the smallest quintile. Regression results for this 
subsample are consistent with our main results. Jointly, tests that address endogeneity and self-
selection corroborate our conclusions.   
 To sharpen the analysis, we perform three robustness tests. First, our results may reflect 
a firm’s general propensity to provide guidance, not specifically the issuance of management 
dividend forecasts. To exclude this alternative explanation, we control for whether the firm 
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provides earnings guidance. We do not find significant associations between earnings guidance 
and significant DPS reduction and DPS barely beat. This result suggests that managers provide 
divided guidance specifically to reduce optimism in analyst dividend forecasts and to beat the 
analyst dividend consensus. Second, we repeat the analysis when we use the median analyst 
dividend forecast to construct significant DPS reduction and DPS barely beat and find consistent 
evidence. This result suggests that our conclusions are unlikely to be driven by the way we create 
the dependent variables. Third, we relate significant DPS reduction and DPS barely beat to 
dividend guidance characteristics. We document that over 65% of management dividend 
forecasts are issued below the contemporaneous analyst dividend consensus forecast, a result 
consistent with firms downward guiding analyst dividend expectations. Furthermore, we report 
that the number of management dividend forecasts issued in a fiscal year, the magnitude of the 
implied consensus revision (i.e. the percentage difference between the analyst consensus 
dividend forecast and the managerial dividend forecast), and dividend guidance issued early in a 
fiscal year predict the likelihood a firm will meet or beat the consensus dividend forecast by a 
small margin. Jointly, these additional results confirm the important role dividend guidance plays 
in reducing optimisms in analyst dividend forecasts.  
We recognize that two conditions are necessary for managers to provide dividend 
guidance. First, there is uncertainty about future dividend payments that guidance helps to 
resolve. In other words, dividend guidance influences analyst dividend expectations. Second, 
investors react negatively to disappointing dividend news. Managers care about the market 
penalty for reporting negative dividend surprises because low share price negatively affects (1) 
the value of their stock options and stock sales after the dividend announcement and (2) new 
equity issues (Richardson et al., 2004). Supplementary tests confirm that management dividend 
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forecasts influence revisions in analyst dividend forecasts and that investors react negatively to 
disappointing dividend news. These findings confirm that managers have the incentive to guide 
analyst dividend expectations if the firm is at risk of failing to meet the consensus forecast.4  
This study will interest both academics and market participants. First, our research 
contributes to the literature on the interactions between management guidance and analyst 
forecasts. The bulk of previous studies focused on the walkdown in analyst earnings forecasts 
(Richardson et al., 2004; Cotter et al., 2006; Matsumoto, 2002; Bartov et al., 2002; Brown and 
Caylor, 2005; Feng and McVay, 2010) and the association between guidance and analyst 
following (Anantharaman and Zhang, 2011; Chatalova et al., 2016). The walkdown literature 
attributes declining optimism in analyst earnings forecasts to firms downward guiding analyst 
earnings expectations. We contribute to this literature by documenting how dividend guidance 
affects changes in analyst dividend expectations over the fiscal year. A distinct feature of our 
study is that we focus on explicit dividend guidance rather than trying to infer guidance from the 
sign of the earnings (or dividend) surprise, which is the most common approach used to capture 
guidance (e.g., Matsumoto 2002; Bartov et al., 2002; Richardson et al., 2004; Brown and 
Higgins, 2005). Hutton (2005) argues that just observing a declining optimism in analyst 
forecasts does not distinguish between guidance and no-guidance firms. We expect dividend 
guidance to increase in importance in the overall firm market communication because investors 
are increasingly turning to dividend paying stocks. To illustrate, Bases and Campos (2010) state 
that “[F]rustrated investors watching their incomes evaporate due to plunging bond yields have 
                                                          
4 Firms can manage dividends to avoid reporting disappointing dividend news. However, the cost of managing 
dividends is higher compared to dividend guidance because dividends have to be backed by cash flows. Zhang 
(2006) highlights that firms can manipulate cash flows through costly real activities management (Roychowdhury, 
2006), such as lower price discounts and reduction in discretionary expenditures, e.g., advertising R&D expenses. 
Apart from being costly, cash flow management, such as selling receivables, transfers in and out of trading securities 
or decreasing working capital, are easier to detect than accrual management (Zhang, 2006), which further reduces 
firms’ incentives to use cash flow management to beat analyst dividend forecasts. Consequently, we expect dividend 
guidance to be more important than cash flow management in achieving analyst dividend expectations.   
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turned to dividend-paying stocks, and they're being rewarded for it.” Harris et al. (2015) report 
that some mutual funds pay a premium to purchase stocks before dividend payments to 
artificially increase their dividends and that investors reward these funds with higher net 
inflows.5    
Second, we contribute novel results to the literature on analyst dividend forecasts. Only a 
handful of studies have examined the properties of analyst dividend forecasts (Brown et al., 
2002; 2007; Bilinski and Bradshaw, 2016), with the main focus of these studies being on 
dividend forecast accuracy and the link between accuracy of earnings and dividend estimates. 
Our evidence on the impact dividend guidance has on dividend forecast optimism improves 
understanding of the factors shaping analyst dividend forecasts and the properties of analyst 
dividend estimates. Our study differs from Bilinski and Bradshaw (2016), who study how 
variability in reported dividends affects analyst propensity to report dividend estimates and the 
properties of analysts’ dividend forecasts, such as accuracy and informativeness. Our study 
focuses on management dividend guidance and how it affects analyst dividend expectations and 
helps reduce the likelihood of negative dividend surprises. Our findings suggest it is essential to 
control for dividend guidance when studying properties of analyst dividend forecasts and 
dividend surprises, e.g., dividend surprise studies should consider the impact right-shift in the 
dividend surprise distribution has on inferences. 
Third, our results help explain why some studies (e.g., Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; 
Benartzi et al., 1997; Conroy et al., 2000; Fukuda, 2000; Abeyratna and Power, 2002; Andres et 
                                                          
5 Investors turning to dividend paying stocks can increase firms’ propensity to pay dividends and, as a result, their 
incentive to provide dividend guidance. We address this concern by controlling for institutional ownership in our 
analysis. We focus on dividends rather than share repurchases because repurchases are used primarily for transitory, 
non-operating cash flows  and thus represent less credible signals about future firm prospects and entail little 
incentive for guidance (Jagannathan et al., 2000). Specifically, there is little need for consistency in earning news 
and share repurchase signals because share repurchases are infrequent and not binding.  
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al., 2013) find weak or no support for the dividend signaling hypothesis when dividend news are 
measured by the time-series of dividend payments. First, our results suggest that investors form 
dividend expectations based on analyst forecasts, not random-walk forecasts. Second, firms 
actively guide analyst dividend expectation to beatable levels, which suggests that dividend 
surprises tend to be small and positive. Both factors contribute to low power of tests that attempt 
to find associations between dividend changes and stock prices.  
   
2. Literature review and hypothesis 
Our study builds on two literature streams to examine the association between management 
dividend guidance and optimism in analyst dividend forecasts: the earnings walkdown literature 
and the dividend signaling studies.  
 
2.1 Earnings walkdown 
A large body of literature documents a significant reduction in analyst earnings forecast 
optimism over the course of the fiscal year, a pattern commonly referred to as the earnings 
walkdown (Richardson et al., 2004; Cotter et al., 2006; Matsumoto, 2002; Bartov et al., 2002; 
Brown and Caylor, 2005; Feng and McVay, 2010; Chatalova et al., 2016). These studies attribute 
the walkdown pattern to management communication that guides analyst earnings forecast to 
beatable levels.6 Managers can influence analyst earnings expectations because analysts depend 
on them for information and issuing forecasts contrary to guidance may reduce the analyst’s 
access to the management (Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Lim, 2001).   
                                                          
6 Bartov and Cohen (2009) highlight that firms use earnings guidance more commonly than earnings management 
to meet analyst earnings expectations because the cost of the former is lower.   
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Richardson et al. (2004) argue that managers guide analyst earnings expectations to avoid 
negative price reactions to disappointing earnings news because low share prices negatively 
affect (1) the value of stock options and stock sales after the earnings announcement and (2) new 
equity issues. Specifically, Richardson et al. (2004, 889) argue that “in the majority of 
transactions, managerial and firm equity sales occur during a short window after earnings 
announcements” and that “managers who are about to sell shares on their personal account or on 
behalf of the firm after an earnings-announcement care about the firm’s short-term post-
announcement stock price level.”7 The survey evidence in Graham et al. (2005) confirms that 
CFOs view meeting analyst earnings benchmarks as an important means to build credibility in 
the capital market and to maintain or increase the firm’s stock price. Furthermore, the market 
penalty for missing the analyst consensus earnings forecast tends to be higher than for beating 
the consensus (Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Bartov et al., 2002). We 
expect that similar concerns about the negative price reaction to disappointing dividend news 
will incentivize managers to guide analyst dividend forecasts to beatable levels.   
 
2.2 Dividend signaling 
Eije and Megginson (2008) study payout policies of 15 European Union countries over the 
period 1989–2005. They report that the proportion of European dividend payers decreased from 
around 88% in 1989 to 51% in 2005. Their results echo Fama and French's (2001) findings for 
the U.S. and international evidence by Denis and Osobov (2008), LaPorta et al. (2000) and 
                                                          
7 Previous studies report that most firms announce dividends contemporaneously with earnings. Chen et al. (2002) 
report that firms in Commonwealth countries announce dividends at the same time as earnings. Similar evidence is 
available for firms in Austria (Gurgul et al., 2003) and Germany (Andres et al. 2013). Dividends and earnings are 
also announced jointly in Japan (Conroy et al., 2000), Hong Kong (Cheng et al., 2007), and Australia (Easton, 
1991). Aharony and Swary (1980, 3) report that for U.S. stocks “[A] major difficulty [in assessing dividend 
information content] lies in the fact that quarterly earnings and dividend figures often are released to the public at 
approximately the same time.” 
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Pinkowitz et al. (2006). Eije and Megginson (2008) find that contrary to the U.S., dividends 
remain the main way of distributing cash to shareholders, with only 17% of listed firms 
repurchasing stock in 2005.  
The dividend signaling model (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985, and Miller 
and Rock, 1985) predicts that dividend increases (cuts) signal higher (lower) future earnings and 
associate with positive (negative) price reactions at dividend announcements. If investors mark 
down prices of firms reporting negative dividend surprises, managers can guide dividend 
expectations to avoid reporting disappointing dividend news. Thus, dividends can serve an 
important signaling role.    
Empirical support for the dividend signaling model is mixed. Using time-series of 
dividend payments to measure dividend news, early studies find significant correlations between 
dividend changes and stock prices. For example, Aharony and Swary (1980) document a positive 
association between quarterly dividend announcements and stock prices for NYSE listed stocks. 
Easton (1991) finds significant information content of dividend changes for a sample of 
contemporaneous dividend and earnings announcements in Australia. Empirical tests in Pettit 
(1972, 1976), Healey and Palepu (1988), and Ghosh and Woolridge (1991) also support the 
dividend signaling hypothesis. However, other studies, including Ang (1975), Gonedes (1978), 
Watts (1973), Lang and Litzenberger (1989) and Benartzi et al.  (1997), find weak or no 
evidence that investors react to dividend announcements in the U.S., which questions the 
signaling role of dividends. Conroy et al. (2000) and Fukuda (2000) find no evidence on the 
signaling role of dividends for Japanese stocks.8 Zuguang and Ahmed (2014) document that 
investors do not react negatively to dividend cuts for stocks listed on the Shanghai Stock 
                                                          
8 The Japanese institutional setting can explain results in Conroy et al. (2000) and Fukuda (2000). Specifically, 
investors can anticipate future dividends because Japanese firms are mandated to provide guidance on future 
dividends at current dividend announcements.  
12 
 
Exchange. Vieira (2011) finds that dividend changes do not elicit significant market reactions for 
French firms and only weak price reactions for Portuguese and UK firms.9 
Previous studies measure dividend surprises as time-series dividend changes. In contrast, 
we measure the variance between the reported dividend and the analyst consensus dividend 
forecast. Our focus on analyst dividend expectations is motivated by evidence that investors rely 
on analyst forecasts, rather than time series estimates, in forming expectations of annual results 
(Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Bartov et al., 2002; Bilinski and 
Bradshaw 2016). If investors penalize firms for missing analyst dividend expectations, managers 
have the incentive to guide analyst dividend expectations to avoid reporting disappointing 
dividend news.  Thus, our main hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: Managers guide analyst dividend expectations to avoid reporting negative 
dividend surprises.  
  
3. Data 
We use I/B/E/S to collect analyst annualized dividend forecasts, actual dividends and managerial 
dividend guidance for dividend payers from 12 European countries for fiscal years 2006–2013.  
We start in 2006 because management dividend forecasts before 2006 are scarce. We collect 
information on whether the firm issued dividend guidance in a fiscal year and, when available, 
the value of guidance and the value of the analyst consensus dividend forecast at the time 
management guidance was issued. Accounting information is from Compustat Global, and we 
use Compustat Global Security Daily for market information. We use Factset to collect 
information on institutional ownership. A firm’s actual and forecasted dividends are expressed in 
                                                          
9 The key prediction of the dividend signaling hypothesis is a positive association between current dividend changes 
and future earnings changes, a prediction Nissim and Ziv (2001) and Bilinski and Bradshaw (2016) confirm.  
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the default reporting currency assigned by I/B/E/S to every firm under coverage.10 We exclude 
firms for which the default reporting currency is different from the currency in which the stock 
trades to ensure all measures, such as dividend forecast optimism, are computed on a consistent 
basis. The initial sample was comprised of 12,257 firm-years with at least one dividend forecast 
in a fiscal year. The final sample includes 5,869 firm-years with non-missing information for 
explanatory variables for regression analysis. 
 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample of 5,869 firm-years. Panel A 
documents that on average, over 12 analysts following a stock in a year issue dividend forecasts, 
with the mean number of dividend forecasts per year being close to 27. Jointly, these results 
suggest that analyst dividend forecasts are ubiquitous. Panel A also reports that in 60.7% of firm-
years, reported dividends meet or beat the analyst consensus dividend forecast by at least 1% at 
the fiscal year-end. To put this number into context, firms meet or exceed the consensus earnings 
forecast at fiscal year-end by at least 1% in 46.2% of firm-years. Thus, a significant number of 
firms report dividends in line or higher than the consensus, evidence consistent with managerial 
guidance.11  
  Panel B examines the sign of the dividend surprise conditional on the sign of the 
earnings surprise. If dividends and earnings are linked by a constant payout ratio, dividend 
surprises will simply reflect earnings surprises and should not reveal new information. Such a 
result would suggest that managers have the incentive to manage analyst earnings, but not 
dividend expectations. We document that earnings and dividend surprises of the same sign do 
                                                          
10 The I/B/E/S detail history user guide specifies that all detailed estimates on I/B/E/S are provided in the default 
currency that I/B/E/S allocates to each firm. This is usually the firm’s reporting currency. All estimates received in a 
currency other than the default currency are converted to the default firm currency using the exchange rate of the 
estimate’s activation date.   
11 Higher proportion of firms that meet or beat the analyst dividend than earnings consensus forecast can reflect that 
dividends are comparatively easier to forecast. However, in untabulated results, we find that the percentage dividend 
forecast error is only marginally smaller than the percentage earnings forecast error (13.8% vs. 14.7%), which 
suggests analysts face a challenge in forecasting dividends.    
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not always coincide. To illustrate, for firms that exceed analyst earnings expectations in a year, 
22.5% of firms also exceed analyst dividend forecasts. Furthermore, only 19.7% of firms with 
negative earnings news also report negative dividend surprises. These results suggest that 
dividend surprises can convey incremental information to earnings news. In sum, the results in 
Table 1 suggest that (1) analyst dividend forecasts are routinely available for dividend paying 
stocks, (2) the majority of firms meet or exceed analyst dividend expectations at fiscal year-end, 
and (3) dividend news does not simply mirror earnings news. These results suggest firms have an 
incentive to manage analyst dividend expectations.  
 
4. Do firms manage analyst dividend expectations? 
We use two measures to examine if firms try to influence analyst dividend expectations to meet 
or beat the dividend consensus at dividend announcements. First, we examine if there is evidence 
of a walkdown in analyst dividend expectations over the course of the fiscal year. Second, we 
test whether firms report significantly higher proportion of small positive than small negative 
dividend surprises. Previous studies attribute small positive earnings surprises to managers' 
downward guiding analyst earnings expectations (Dreman and Berry, 1995; Degeorge et al., 
1999; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; Gore et al., 2007). We anticipate that an unusually high 
frequency of small positive dividend surprises reflects firms guiding analyst dividend forecasts to 
beatable levels.   
 
4.1 Walkdown in analyst dividend forecasts  
We test if firms walk down analyst dividend expectations by examining changes in optimism in 
analyst dividend estimates over the course of the fiscal year. We focus on changes in optimism 
15 
 
because the earnings walkdown literature documents optimism in analyst earnings expectations 
in the beginning of the fiscal year, which prompts earnings guidance (Richardson et al., 2004; 
Cotter et al., 2006; Matsumoto, 2002). Earnings guidance helps moderate optimism in analyst 
earnings forecasts, which in return facilitates meeting analyst earnings expectations at year-end. 
In parallel, we expect that managers will provide dividend guidance to reduce the initial 
optimism in analyst dividend forecasts helping the firm meet or beat the consensus dividend 
forecast at fiscal year-end.  
  For this test, we calculate the quarterly dividend forecast bias, DPS bias, which is the 
actual dividend less the analyst consensus dividend forecast calculated at the end of each fiscal-
year quarter. We use the last analyst dividend forecast for a quarter to calculate the consensus 
forecast. We scale this difference by the share price, price, at the end of the previous fiscal year 
to make DPS bias comparable across stocks and multiply by −1 so that positive values reflect 
analyst optimism:  
                                  𝐷𝑃𝑆 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = −1 ×
(𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙− 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠)
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
.    (1) 
Figure 1a plots the mean dividend forecast bias for each quarter. We observe a significant 
reduction in dividend forecast optimism over the course of the fiscal year: the mean DPS bias of 
0.15% in the first fiscal quarter declines to −0.001% in the fourth quarter. The difference in mean 
dividend forecast bias between quarters one and four is significant at the 1% level. For 
comparison, Figure 1a also plots the mean EPS forecast bias calculated similarly to the dividend 
forecast bias. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Richardson et al., 2004; Cotter et al., 2006), 
we document a gradual reduction in analyst EPS forecast optimism over the fiscal year, and the 
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trend is similar to that for analyst dividend forecasts. Figure 1a provides early evidence that firms 
downward guide analyst dividend expectations.12  
[Figure 1] 
 To complement the analysis, we repeat Figure 1a's result on dividend walkdown 
conditional on firms providing dividend guidance. We perform this test because Hutton (2005) 
argues that the earnings walkdown pattern for guidance and no-guidance firms is similar, so 
decreasing optimism in analyst dividend forecasts may not necessarily reflect managerial 
guidance. Figure 1b documents that the magnitude of a reduction in dividend forecast optimism 
is much higher for the sample of firms that issue dividend guidance. The mean DPS bias reduces 
by over 132% in quarter four compared to quarter one (from 0.19% to −0.06%) when firms 
provide dividend guidance, compared to a 83% reduction when they do not (from 0.14% to 
0.02%). Furthermore, the mean DPS_bias in the last fiscal quarter is negative for the sample of 
firms that provide dividend guidance, which suggests that these firms on average exceed the 
consensus. Without dividend guidance, the consensus dividend forecast is higher than the actual 
dividend at fiscal year-end. These results reinforce our conclusion that dividend guidance helps 
managers meet or beat the consensus forecast.    
  
4.2 Discontinuity in dividend surprises around zero 
Next, we investigate whether there is evidence of a discontinuity in dividend surprises around 
zero. Our motives for using this measure are twofold. First, the dividend signaling hypothesis 
predicts significant negative price reactions for firms failing to meet investor dividend 
                                                          
12 The reduction in dividend forecast optimism in Figure 1a does not reflect changes in cash flow forecast optimism. 
Givoly et al. (2009) document that analyst cash flows forecasts are equally optimistic in the beginning and at the end 
of the fiscal year (the mean cash flow bias calculated as in our equation (1) is 0.91% in the beginning of the fiscal 
year and 0.89% at the end of the fiscal year in their Table 6). Thus, the walkdown in analyst dividend forecasts is not 
because of a similar pattern in analyst cash flow forecasts. 
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expectations. Thus, we expect that managers will use dividend guidance to, at minimum, meet 
the dividend consensus forecast. This prediction is consistent with managerial incentives to 
provide earnings guidance. To illustrate, Matsumoto (2002) quotes a business article stating 
“[A]s is the custom late in a quarter, companies have been jawboning analysts’ estimates down 
to be sure the companies at least meet or exceed the consensus figure” (Bleakley 1997). Second, 
we do not expect managers to use downward dividend guidance to secure a strong positive 
dividend surprise because this is costly. To illustrate, dividend guidance significantly below the 
contemporaneous analyst dividend consensus can lead to a significant downward stock price 
pressure and may discourage stock purchases by dividend-oriented investors (Hamm, Li and Ng 
2012; Graham and Kumar 2006). Thus, discontinuity in small dividend surprises around zero is 
an intuitive indicator of managerial dividend guidance.  
Figure 2 reports the frequencies of dividend surprises calculated as the actual dividend 
less the analyst consensus dividend forecast measured in the last fiscal quarter, DPS actual – 
DPS consensus, over a fifty cent range centered on zero.13 As before, we use the last analyst 
forecast for the quarter to calculate the consensus dividend forecast. We observe that small 
positive dividend surprises (of 1 unit above the consensus) are more frequent than small negative 
dividend surprises (of 1 unit below the consensus). Furthermore, using the standardized 
difference statistic from Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Burgstahler and Eames (2003), we 
confirm higher than expected frequency of small positive dividend surprises (p-value = 0.000). 
The evidence from Figure 2 on discontinuity in dividend surprises around zero corroborates our 
conclusion from Figure 1.    
[Figure 2] 
                                                          
13 Most countries in the sample use the Euro currency. For the UK, the range is expressed in pence, ore for Sweden 
and Denmark and rappen for Switzerland. 
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4.3 Firm guidance and optimism in analyst dividend forecasts 
This section reports formal tests for the prediction that firms guide analyst dividend expectations 
towards levels they can beat. Specifically, we construct a variable significant DPS reduction 
equal to 1 if the consensus DPS bias in quarter four reduces by more than 50% compared to 
quarter one, and 0 otherwise. We expect that such a significant reduction in analyst dividend 
forecast optimism will be driven by dividend guidance. Furthermore, we create a variable DPS 
barely beat that equals 1 if the firm reports a zero or a one unit (e.g., one cent) dividend surprise, 
and 0 otherwise. Meeting or beating the consensus forecast by a small margin commonly 
associates with firms guiding analyst expectations to beatable levels (Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997; Burgstahler and Eames, 2003).  
 Next, we relate significant DPS reduction and DPS barely beat to managerial guidance. 
As a first-cut test, we examine if broadly defined guidance affects the two indicator variables. 
For this test, we estimate the following logit model predicting the likelihood of a significant 
reduction in dividend forecast optimism or of zero or small positive dividend surprises: 
𝑃(𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑃𝑆 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 or 𝐷𝑃𝑆 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑡 )
= 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑞4,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑞4,𝑡
+ 𝛾4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞4,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛾6𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑡−1
+ 𝛾7𝐵 𝑀⁄ 𝑡−1 + 𝛾8 ln 𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛾9𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑞4,𝑡−1 + 𝛾10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛾11𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡−1 + 𝛾12𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 
+ 𝛾13𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛾14𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛾15𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 + 𝛾16𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑡−1
+ 𝛾17𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝛹𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝛩𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 




where Guidance takes a value of 1 if a firm issued either earnings or dividend guidance in a 
fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise. To sharpen the analysis, we also disaggregate Guidance into 
earnings (EPS_guidance) and dividend guidance (DPS guidance) and include the two indicator 
variables in Equation (2). EPS guidance takes a value of 1 if a firm issued earnings guidance in a 
fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise. DPS guidance takes a value of 1 if a firm issued dividend guidance 
in a fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise. We expect that strong reductions in initially optimistic analyst 
dividend forecasts and zero or small positive dividend surprises are more likely due to explicit 
dividend guidance.  
 
4.3.1 Firm controls 
The set of controls in Equation (2) is based on previous research (Brown 2001; Matsumoto 2002; 
Richardson et al., 2004; Cotter et al., 2006) and include percentage institutional ownership, 
Inst_Ownership. Higher institutional ownership increases analysts’ incentives to produce 
accurate forecasts, which should reduce average dividend forecast bias and the likelihood of a 
significant reduction in dividend forecast optimism (Ljungqvist et al., 2007; Ajinkya et al., 
2004). We control for the number of analysts following a firm, Analyst following, and the 
heterogeneity in analyst dividend expectations, Dispersion, because reducing dividend forecast 
optimism may prove more challenging for stocks with high analyst coverage and when 
dispersion in dividend expectations is higher (Cotter et al., 2006). We include total accruals, 
Total Accruals, because analysts tend to be more optimistic about high accrual stocks (Bradshaw 
et al., 2001) and we expect stronger corrections in the initial optimism of dividend forecasts for 
these firms. High earnings volatility, Earnings STD, should reduce the precision of earnings 
news and increase the relative weight investors attach to dividend signals (Miller and Rock, 
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1985; Ertimur et al., 2003). Because importance of dividends to investors increases, analysts 
should have more incentives to issue unbiased dividend forecasts. This in turn should lead to 
more significant revisions in dividend forecast optimism over the course of the fiscal year.   
Analyst dividend estimates may be initially more optimistic for larger firms and firms 
with fewer growth opportunities because few investment opportunities increase the incentive to 
distribute cash through dividends. Higher initial dividend forecast optimism for these stocks is 
more likely to correct over the course of the fiscal year. We use the book-to-market ratio, B/M, to 
capture the firm’s investment opportunities and firm market capitalization, MV, to capture firm 
size. For comparability, we express market capitalization in Euro million using year-end 
exchange rates. We expect that beating the analyst dividend benchmark is less important for 
firms with high share price momentum, Mom, and for more profitable stocks, which we measure 
by return on assets, ROA. Asem (2009) reports that investors underreact to dividend cuts for high 
momentum stocks, which he attributes to a behavioral bias of momentum investors. Thus, we 
expect fewer significant reductions in dividend forecast optimism for high momentum and more 
profitable stocks. We also control for past payout ratios, past payout ratio, because larger past 
payouts may suggest higher future dividends leading to initially optimistic forecasts that correct 
over the fiscal year.  
 
4.3.2 Country controls 
A country’s institutional setting is likely to affect how investors interpret dividend signals, thus 
the effort analysts put into producing unbiased dividend forecasts. Less optimistically biased 
dividend forecasts issued early in a fiscal year should reduce the likelihood of a significant 
reduction in dividend forecast optimism over the course of the year. Dividend clientele theories 
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(Grinstein and Michaely, 2005; Desai and Jin, 2011; Ferreira et al., 2010) predict that firms pay 
higher dividends when tax regimes favor dividend over capital gain income. Investors are also 
likely to attach comparatively more weight to dividend information in regimes favoring dividend 
income, which should increase the effort analysts put into producing unbiased dividend forecasts. 
Following Ferreira et al. (2010), our measure of investor dividend preference is the ratio of the 
after-tax yield from a USD  of dividend income scaled by the after-tax yield from a dollar of 
long-term capital gain, assuming top marginal statutory tax rates, Dividend tax preference. 
Higher values of Dividend tax preference capture a higher preference for dividend compared to 
capital gain income.  
We include two variables to capture country-level propensity to manage earnings because 
earnings management increases the relative usefulness of dividends compared to earnings as 
signals of firm value. Higher usefulness of dividend signals to investors should increase analyst 
effort to produce unbiased dividend forecasts. Loss avoidance, which is the country’s ratio of 
small reported profits to small reported losses, captures the extent to which insiders manage 
earnings to avoid reporting losses. Earnings smoothing captures a country’s correlation between 
changes in accounting accruals and operating cash flows. Leuz et al. (2003) highlight that 
accruals allow firms to conceal economic shocks to the firm’s operating cash flow and create 
reserves to report higher future performance. Loss avoidance and Earnings smoothing are from 
Leuz et al. (2003).  
We include the Financial transparency index for each country from Bushman et al. 
(2004), which captures the intensity and timeliness of financial disclosures by firms, analysts and 
the media. We expect that investors will attach less weight to dividend signals if alternative 
sources of information about future firm earnings exist. Dividend signals should be more 
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valuable in countries with the shareholder corporate governance system because dividends play 
an important role in reducing agency problems (La Porta et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001; 
Goergen et al., 2005).  
We include the time-varying Rule of law measure from Kaufmann et al. (2009) to capture 
differences in governance across countries. Higher quality governance reduces the monitoring 
role of dividends (Djankov et al., 2008) and thus analysts’ incentives to produce accurate 
dividend forecasts. Finally, we measure the importance of equity markets in a country because 
the dividend income may be more important in countries where equity markets play a more 
significant role. Importance of equity market is from Leuz et al. (2003) and is measured by a 
country’s average rank based on (1) the ratio of the aggregate stock market value held by 
minority investors to gross national product; (2) the number of listed domestic stocks relative to 
the population; and, (3) the number of IPOs relative to the population. Industry effects are 
industry dummies based on Fama and French’s 10 industry definitions. Year effects are year 
dummies for the fiscal year. We present detailed definitions of the variables in Appendix A. 
Table 2 reports average values for the two variables significant DPS reduction and DPS 
barely beat from Equation (2) across our sample countries.14 More than half of firm-years 
(55.4%) experience a significant reduction in the consensus dividend forecast optimism over the 
fiscal year. Furthermore, we document that 12.9% of firms either meet or barely beat the 
consensus dividend forecast. The last two columns of Table 2 report the frequency of firms 
providing managerial guidance (either earnings or dividend guidance) and explicit dividend 
guidance. For firms that issue management forecasts, dividend guidance is available on average 
for 56% of firm-years.  
                                                          
14 We only retain observations with non-missing values for control variables from equation (2), which leaves a 




Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the control variables in model (2). The average 
institutional ownership is close to 26%, and on average, over 17 analysts cover a stock. Mean 
dividend forecast volatility is 26.87%, total accruals are −0.047 of total assets and the average 
asset-scaled earnings volatility is 3.65%. The mean book-to-market ratio is 0.631, and average 
firm capitalization in the sample is close to Euro4.5billion.15 Price return momentum is 3.22%, 
and average ROA is 5.76%. The mean payout ratio is 47.9%. On average, tax systems favor the 
capital gain over the dividend income. Loss avoidance, earnings smoothing, financial 
transparency, rule of law, and the importance of equity market indices are comparable with 
previous studies (La Porta et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 2003; Bushman et al., 2004; Kaufmann et al., 
2009).    
  [Table 3] 
 
4.4 Predicting significant reductions in the consensus dividend forecast optimism 
Table 4 reports regression results for Equation (2). Column Model (1) reports results in which we 
include country fixed effects instead of country controls from Equation (2). The positive 
coefficient on Guidance is consistent with our prediction that a significant reduction in analyst 
dividend forecast optimism is more likely when firms provide guidance. The positive coefficient 
on Guidance is also present when we use the full specification of Equation (2) in column Model 
(2).  
                                                          
15 Relatively high market capitalization reflects that dividend payers tend to be larger than non-payers (DeAngelo et 
al. 2004, 2006). For comparison, the mean market capitalization of dividend payers is USD4.8billion for U.S. 
dividend payers in Goldstein et al. (2015), Euro4–7billion in Andres et al. (2013), and DKK12billion in Raaballe 
and Hedensted (2008). 
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Next, we disaggregate guidance into earnings guidance and dividend guidance. Column 
Model (3) in Table 4 shows that only dividend guidance has a significant effect on reducing 
optimism in analyst dividend forecasts. This result suggests that the conclusion on a positive 
association between Guidance and significant DPS reduction is driven by explicit dividend 
guidance. In other words, earnings guidance on its own does not contain information that can 
significantly influence analyst dividend expectations, which is why managers provide explicit 
dividend forecasts. This result reflects that earnings are a noisy signal of dividends, consistent 
with the weak link between earnings and dividends reported by Skinner (2008) and survey 
evidence suggesting firms do not target specific payout ratios (Brav et al., 2005). The effect of 
dividend guidance is economically significant: dividend guidance increases the likelihood of a 
significant reduction in analyst dividend forecast optimism by 6.9%. Together, Table 4 results 
suggest that dividend guidance helps reduce analyst dividend forecast optimism, which in return 
should facilitate meeting or beating the analyst consensus dividend forecast at the dividend 
announcement.    
 Examining the control variables, we find that a significant reduction in analyst dividend 
forecast optimism is more likely for smaller, less profitable firms and in countries with higher 
rule of law. Analysts tend to issue more optimistic forecasts for smaller firms and firms that 
manage earnings (Das et al., 1998; Bradshaw et al., 2001), and these initially more optimistic 
forecasts are more likely to be revised downward during the fiscal year. Dividend signals are 
likely to be more important for less profitable firms (Nissim and Ziv, 2001), which can increase 
the effort analysts put to produce unbiased dividend forecasts. This in return will reduce the 
likelihood of a significant reduction in analyst dividend forecast optimism. Bonetti and Bozzolan 
(2002) report stronger earnings guidance in countries with higher rule of law because the penalty 
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for reporting disappointing earnings news is higher. This can entice analysts to more strongly 
revise their forecasts to beatable levels.  
  [Table 4] 
 
4.5 Predicting zero or small positive dividend surprises 
To corroborate the evidence that firms guide analyst dividend forecasts to beat the analyst 
dividend consensus, we also estimate a variation of Equation (2) where the dependent variable is 
DPS barely beat, which captures instances when a firm meets or beats the analyst consensus 
dividend forecast by a small margin. We expect that control variables from Equation (2) that 
predict a reduction in dividend forecast optimism will also increase the likelihood a firm will 
report a zero or a small positive dividend surprises. We report regression results for this model in 
Table 5. We confirm that dividend guidance increases the likelihood a firm will meet or beat the 
dividend consensus by a small margin and the economic effect of dividend guidance is 
significant—dividend guidance increases the likelihood of zero or small positive dividend news 
by 13.2%. We do not find evidence that earnings guidance impacts the likelihood of small 
positive dividend surprises. This result mirrors evidence in Table 4 and explains why firms 
provide explicit dividend guidance to avoid reporting negative dividend news.    
[Table 5] 
For control variables in Table 5, we find that firms are more likely to report small 
positive dividend surprises when the importance of dividend news is higher. This includes 
instances when earnings volatility is high and for firms with few investment opportunities 
because agency costs for these firms are high. High earnings volatility reduces the signaling 
value of earnings news, which should increase the relative weight investors attach to dividend 
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news and thus managerial incentives to avoid disappointing divided surprises (Miller and Rock, 
1985; Ertimur et al., 2003). Dividends perform an important monitoring role for firms with high 
agency costs (Easton, 1991). Higher dividend forecast dispersion reduces the likelihood of small 
positive dividend surprises. This result reflects greater difficulty guiding heterogeneous analyst 
expectations. Smaller firms and firms with higher analyst coverage and lower profitability are 
more likely to meet or beat the analyst dividend consensus by a small margin; the penalty for 
reporting negative dividend news for these firms is higher (Ghosh and Woolridge, 1991; Andres 
et al. 2013). Finally, the coefficient on the past payout ratio is negative. Analysts are likely to 
issue more optimistic dividend forecasts for high payout stocks, and reducing dividend forecast 
optimism for these stocks may be more challenging, which increases the difficulty of meeting the 
dividend consensus. For country controls, we find that firms are more likely to meet or beat the 
dividend consensus by a small margin in countries with lower importance of equity markets, 
financial transparency and governance quality. Dividends play an important monitoring role in 
these countries (La Porta et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001; Goergen et al., 2005), which increases 
firms’ incentives to avoid reporting negative dividend news.  
 
5. Self-selection and endogeneity concerns 
There is a concern our results may be affected by selectivity in analysts’ stock coverage. 
Specifically, in untabulated results, we find that on average, analysts provide coverage for 62% 
of firm-years for Compustat Global dividend payers. This relatively high proportion reflects that 
dividend paying stocks tend to be larger, and larger stocks are frequently covered by analysts 
(Bhushan, 1989). To address the potential impact self-selection has on our results, we perform 
two tests. First, we repeat the analysis for fiscal years 2010–2013 in which over 87% of dividend 
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payers have analyst coverage and find consistent results. We report these results in column 
2010–2013 in Panel A of Table 6.  
Second, we repeat the analysis for the quintile of stocks with the highest institutional 
ownership when analyst coverage choices are constrained. The intuition for this test is that 
brokers routinely cover stocks with large institutional holdings because sell-side analysts are 
compensated out of trade commissions and commissions increase with the size of institutional 
ownership (Irvine, 2004). Consistent with this prediction, 80% of stocks in the highest 
institutional ownership quintile are covered by analysts as opposed to 28% coverage for the 
smallest quintile. Column Top IO quintile reports regression results for the top quintile of 
institutional ownership. We find that dividend guidance increases both the likelihood of a 
significant reduction in analyst dividend forecast optimism and of zero or small positive dividend 
surprises. Jointly, results reported in Panel A of Table 6 build confidence that our conclusions 
are not driven by the self-selection bias arising from the non-randomness in analyst stock 
coverage choices (Rajan and Servaes, 1997).  
Our descriptive statistics show a relatively high mean market capitalization of dividend 
payers, consistent with past evidence that these tend to be larger stocks (DeAngelo et al., 2004, 
2006; Goldstein et al., 2015; Andres et al., 2013; Raaballe and Hedensted 2008). However, if the 
likelihood of a significant reduction in analyst dividend forecast optimism and of zero or small 
positive dividend surprises correlates with unobserved firm characteristics that in return correlate 
with firm size, then our sample composition can affect our conclusions. We believe this is 
unlikely for three reasons. First, our regressions control for firm size, and the sign of the 
coefficient on ln MV is the opposite to that for DPS guidance. Second, as we show next, our 
conclusions are unchanged when we control for firm effects. Third, our conclusions are 
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unchanged when we partition the sample on firm size into relatively smaller and larger stocks 
and repeat the analysis for the former group. We tabulate this result in column Relatively smaller 
firms of Table 6, Panel A. We acknowledge that despite our best effort, we cannot preclude the 
possibility that sample selection affects our conclusions, although we believe these tests make it 
unlikely.  
[Table 6] 
 The conclusion on the positive association between dividend guidance and significant 
DPS reduction and DPS barely beat can capture cases when both dividend guidance and 
reduction in analyst dividend forecast optimism and small positive dividend surprises are driven 
by the same unobservable factors. To address the endogeneity concern, we perform two tests. 
First, we repeat the two logistic regressions using instrumental variables estimation. As the 
instrument, we use the fraction of firms that provide dividend guidance in the company’s 
industry in the previous fiscal year. To control for cross-country differences, we calculate the 
measure separately for each country. We expect that a firm will be more likely to engage in 
dividend guidance when a larger proportion of its peers guide analyst dividend forecasts. 
However, past peer guidance should not affect the magnitude of a reduction in analyst dividend 
forecast optimism or the likelihood the firm will meet the analyst dividend consensus by a small 
margin. Thus, the instrument meets both the exclusion restriction and the relevance condition.  
Panel B of Table 6 reports results from instrumental variables regressions. The first-stage 
results confirm a positive association between the firm’s propensity to issue dividend guidance 
and the fraction of firms in the company’s industry that issue dividend guidance. The second-
stage regressions continue to show a positive association between dividend guidance and 
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significant DPS reduction and DPS barely beat, which suggests our results are robust to 
endogeneity.   
Our second test repeats the two logistic regressions after we include firm effects. Firm 
effects capture unobserved firm-level characteristics that can correlate with changes in properties 
of analyst dividend forecasts and the dividend guidance indicator. The Hausman test suggests the 
random effects model is preferred. We report regression results in column Firm effects of Panel 
B. Regression results show a positive association between dividend guidance and significant 
DPS reduction and DPS barely beat, consistent with our earlier conclusions.    
In unreported results, we repeated the two logistic regressions using the median analyst 
dividend forecast to construct significant DPS reduction and DPS barely beat. Regression results 
for the recalculated dependent variables are consistent with our main findings, which suggests 
our conclusions are unlikely to be driven by the way we create the dependent variables.  
  
5.1 Characteristics of dividend guidance 
In this section, we relate significant DPS reduction and DPS barely beat to dividend guidance 
characteristics. We examine four characteristics of dividend guidance. First, we count the 
number of management dividend forecasts issued during the fiscal year, # of management DPS 
forecasts. We expect that firms that issue more dividend forecasts will be more likely to 
significantly lower optimism in analyst dividend forecasts and beat the dividend consensus by a 
small margin. Second, we measure the implied analyst dividend forecast revision, implied DPS 
revision, which is defined as the percentage difference between the analyst consensus dividend 
forecast measured at the dividend guidance announcement and the value of the management 
dividend forecast. High implied DPS revision should induce a stronger revision in analyst 
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dividend expectations. The third measure is an indicator variable for whether the managerial 
dividend forecast is below the analyst consensus, guidance below consensus. Downward 
guidance should facilitate meeting the consensus dividend forecast and induce a significant 
reduction in the consensus optimism. The fourth characteristic is the guidance horizon, guidance 
horizon, measured as the number of months between the guidance issue date and the fiscal year-
end. We expect that guidance provided earlier in a fiscal year will be more successful in guiding 
analyst dividend expectations to beatable levels because it lowers analyst dividend expectations 
early on. We average guidance characteristics for each firm-year to account for multiple 
forecasts.   
 Panel A of Table 7 reports descriptive statistics for the four measures of dividend 
guidance. On average, close to two management dividend forecasts are issued in a fiscal year, 
and the average implied revision is 47.14%. Average dividend guidance is issued around seven 
months before the fiscal year-end, and over 65% of managerial dividend forecasts are below the 
analyst dividend consensus. The latter result is consistent with managers' downward guiding 
analyst dividend expectations.  
Panel B reports logit regressions for significant DPS reduction and DPS barely beat 
when we augment the set of variables in Equation (2) with dividend guidance characteristics. For 
firms that do not issue dividend guidance and when the value of management dividend forecasts 
is missing, we assume zero values for guidance characteristics. We believe this assumption 
should bias our tests against finding any significant associations. We document a positive 
association between # of management DPS forecasts and DPS barely beat, which is consistent 
with more frequent guidance having a stronger effect on analyst dividend forecasts, which 
facilitates meeting the consensus estimate. Smaller implied revisions in analyst dividend 
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forecasts and dividend guidance issued early in a fiscal year increase the likelihood a firm will 
meet or beat the consensus dividend forecast by a small margin. The former result likely reflects 
that large implied revisions signify a significant optimism in analyst forecasts, which may be 
more difficult to moderate. The latter result is consistent with earlier guidance being more 
successful in moderating analyst optimism to achieve zero or a small dividend surprise. Jointly, 
Table 7 results suggest that the way firms communicate dividend guidance to analysts matters 
when guiding analyst forecasts to beatable levels.   
  [Table 7] 
 
6. Conditions necessary for dividend guidance 
We recognize that two conditions are necessary for managers to provide dividend guidance. 
First, there is uncertainty about future dividend payments that dividend guidance helps resolve. 
In other words, dividend guidance can influence analyst dividend expectations. Second, dividend 
news conveys new information, and investors react negatively to disappointing dividend news. 
This section confirms these two conditions are present in our sample.  
 Our result on a positive association between dividend guidance and the likelihood of a 
significant reduction in analyst dividend forecast optimism is consistent with the prediction that 
analysts factor managerial dividend forecasts into their dividend expectations. However, to 
provide corroborating evidence, we also examine the sign and the magnitude of dividend forecast 
revisions in a two-month period before and after the issuance of management dividend guidance. 
In untabulated results, we document a significant negative mean revision of 2.4% in the period 
after managers issue dividend guidance, which compares to an average positive revision of 0.3% 
in the period before guidance. This result reinforces our conclusion that analysts consider firm 
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dividend guidance when forming dividend expectations. 
Next, we confirm that investors react to dividend surprises that benchmark the actual 
dividend against the analyst dividend consensus. Specifically, we define a positive dividend 
surprise, pos SUD, which is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the actual dividend-
per-share is at least 1% higher than the analyst consensus dividend forecast, and 0 otherwise. A 
negative dividend surprise, neg SUD, equals 1 if the actual dividend per share is at least 1% 
lower than the analyst consensus dividend forecast, and 0 otherwise.16 We calculate the analyst 
consensus dividend forecast as the mean of all dividend forecasts issued by analysts for a firm in 
the last fiscal quarter. To avoid using stale forecasts, we select the latest forecast for each 
analyst. We stop at fiscal year-end to avoid contaminating results by differences in reporting 
timeliness between countries and over time because delays anticipate bad news (Aubert, 2009; 
Bagnoli et al., 2002). However, the conclusions are the same when we (1) select the last forecast 
for each analyst before joint earnings and dividend announcements or (2) calculate the consensus 
dividend forecast as the mean of all dividend forecasts issued in the last fiscal quarter.  
Because dividend announcements usually coincide with preliminary earnings 
announcements, we also calculate positive and negative earnings surprises (pos SUE and neg 
SUE) in a similar way to dividend surprises. We define positive and negative dividend and 
earnings surprises using percentage measures for two reasons. First, our international sample 
does not have uniform currencies (Euro, Pound, Swedish and Danish Kroner, Swiss Franc), 
which makes currency-based intervals (one cent/kroner/franc/pence) not comparable across 
countries. In other words, beating the analyst dividend consensus forecast by 1 kroner is 
comparatively easier than by 1 pence. Second, using percentages makes dividend and earnings 
                                                          
16 We use dummy variables rather than a continuous surprise measure because the indicator variable is easier to 
interpret when we compare positive and negative surprises. In unreported results, we also used 5% and 2.5% 
intervals to define the dividend surprise and find that our main conclusions are unchanged. 
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surprises comparable because, mechanically, firms can more easily beat earnings than dividend 
targets by one unit of a currency since DPS are smaller than EPS.  
To capture the signaling effect of dividend announcements, for each firm-year, we 
calculate the three-day cumulative abnormal return centered on the joint earnings and dividend 
announcement date. We use the index of the stock’s main listing exchange as the normal return 
benchmark. We then relate announcement day CARs to dividend and earnings surprises: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑆𝑈𝐸 𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑆𝑈𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑆𝑈𝐸 𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑆𝑈𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑆𝑈𝐸 𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑆𝑈𝐷𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑆𝑈𝐸 𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑆𝑈𝐷𝑡 + 𝛷𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
+ 𝛹𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛩𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 
(3) 
where Firm controls include the average forecast horizon of analyst dividend estimates 
underlying the consensus dividend forecast and firm controls from Equation (2). Country 
controls include country variables from Equation (2). We expect to find a significant positive 
coefficient when the sign of earnings and dividend news is positive, 𝛽1>0, and a negative 
coefficient on the negative earnings and dividend surprises, 𝛽4<0. Furthermore, consistent with 
the dividend signaling model, the absolute magnitude of the price reaction should be higher 
when there is a consistent sign of earnings and dividend news as opposed to when the signs 
differ, i.e. |𝛽1|>|𝛽2| and |𝛽4|>|𝛽3|. We dual-cluster standard errors on firm and fiscal year.  
 
 6.1 Price reactions to joint earnings and dividend announcements 
Table 8 reports regression results for Equation (3).17 Column Model (1) confirms that investors 
react more strongly when the positive sign of the earnings surprise is consistent with the sign of 
dividend news compared to when the signs differ. Specifically, the coefficient on 
                                                          
17 We lose 1,213 observations in Table 8 due to missing return information.  
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pos_SUE_pos_SUD is 0.014 and significantly higher compared to the coefficient of 0.003 on 
pos_SUE_neg_SUD (F-test = 12.66, p-value =0.000). For negative earnings surprises, the absolute 
magnitude of the coefficient on the indicator for negative dividend and earnings news is higher 
than when negative earnings news associates with positive dividend surprises (F-test = 14.76, p-
value =0.000). These results jointly conform to the prediction of the dividend signaling 
hypothesis and suggest that (1) investors react negatively to disappointing dividend news and (2) 
dividend news provides new information that helps interpret the earnings surprise.  
[Table 8] 
 Next, we examine if the time-series measure of dividend changes contains incremental 
information. Specifically, we create an indicator variable Dividend increase, which takes a value 
of 1 when the current fiscal-year dividend is higher than the previous year dividend, and 0 
otherwise. We also create an indicator variable for dividend decreases, Dividend_reduction, 
which takes a value of 1 for dividend reductions, and 0 otherwise. We then include Dividend 
increase and Dividend reduction in Equation (3). Furthermore, we include in Equation (3) 
interaction terms between non-zero earnings surprises and the zero dividend surprise (pos SUE 
zero SUD and neg SUE zero SUD) and between non-zero dividend surprises and the zero 
earnings surprise (zero SUE pos SUD and zero SUE neg SUD). We define a zero dividend 
(earnings) surprise if the actual dividend is in a 1% caliper of the dividend (earnings) consensus 
forecast. Column Model (2) in Table 8 reports results for the augmented Equation (3). We 
observe that dividend changes have no explanatory power controlling for dividend surprises 
based on analyst forecasts.18 This result is consistent with the evidence in Andres et al. (2013) 
and Bilinski and Bradshaw (2016). Furthermore, we find that investors react negatively to zero 
                                                          
18 Our conclusion that dividend changes have no signaling value persists when we use changes in dividend-per-
share to create the two indicator variables for dividend increases and reductions.  
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earnings surprises when these coincide with negative dividend surprises. Together, the results in 
Table 8 confirm that firms have incentives to meet or beat analyst dividend forecasts to avoid 




This study documents that managers guide analyst dividend forecasts to avoid reporting negative 
dividend surprises. Specifically, we find that dividend guidance predicts (1) a substantial 
reduction in dividend forecast optimism over the course of the fiscal year and (2) the likelihood a 
firm will report a small dividend surprise. To ensure the validity of our results, we subject them 
to a battery of sensitivity tests, including tests that address endogeneity and self-selection 
concerns. Furthermore, we document that investors react negatively to disappointing dividend 
news, which shows that managers have the incentive to guide analyst dividend expectations if 
the firm is at risk of failing to meet the analyst consensus dividend forecast. Jointly, our results 




 Appendix A. Definitions of variables used in the study 
Variable name Definition 
significant DPS 
reduction 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the analyst consensus DPS bias in quarter four reduces 
by more than 50% compared to quarter one, and 0 otherwise. 
DPS barely beat  
An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm reports a zero or a one unit (e.g. one cent) 
dividend surprise relative to the analyst dividend consensus forecast, and 0 zero otherwise.  
Guidance 
An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm issued either earnings or dividend 
guidance in a fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
DPS guidance 
An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm issued dividend guidance in a fiscal 
year, and 0 otherwise. 
EPS guidance 
An indicator variable that which takes a value of 1 if a firm issued earnings guidance in a 
fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
Inst Ownership Percentage institutional ownership of the stock measured at the end of the previous quarter.  
Analyst following 
The number of analysts following a firm measured over a 90-day period before the end of 
the fiscal year. 
Dispersion 
Standard deviation of analyst DPS forecasts scaled by the actual DPS measured over a 90-
day period before the end of the fiscal year. 
Total Accruals 
Total accruals calculated as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items and 
cash from operations from the cash flow statement. The ratio is scaled by total assets and 
measured at the end of the previous fiscal year-end. 
Earnings STD 
Earnings volatility calculated as the standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary 
items scaled by total assets for the previous five fiscal years. The ratio is measured at the 
end of the previous fiscal year-end. 
B/M 
The book-to-market ratio, which is the book value of common equity scaled by firm market 
capitalization. The ratio is measured at the end of the previous fiscal year-end.  
MV Firm market capitalization measured at the end of the previous fiscal year-end.  
Mom 
Stock price momentum calculated as the buy-and-hold return over 90 days before the 
previous fiscal year-end.  
ROA The ratio of earnings before extraordinary items scaled by total assets.  
past payout ratio 




Investor dividend preference, which is the ratio of income that an investor receives from a 
dollar of dividend scaled by the net income that the same investor would have received from 
a dollar of long-term capital gain, assuming top marginal statutory tax rates. The measure 
is from Ferreira et al. (2010). 
Loss avoidance 
Loss avoidance, which is the country's ratio of small reported profits to small reported 
losses, captures the extent to which insiders manage earnings to avoid reporting losses.  A 
firm-year observation is classified as a small profit if net earnings (scaled by lagged total 
assets) are in the range [0,0.01]. A firm-year observation is classified as a small loss if net 
earnings (scaled by lagged total assets) are in the range [0.01,0). The measure is from Leuz 
et al. (2003). 
Earnings 
smoothing 
Earnings smoothing, which is the country’s Spearman correlation between the change in 
accruals and the change in cash flow from operations (both scaled by lagged total assets). 
The measure is from Leuz et al. (2003). 
Financial 
transparency 
The intensity and timeliness of financial disclosures by firms, analysts and the media. The 
index is developed from (1) the average ranking regarding disclosure of research and 
development, capital expenditure, subsidiaries, product segmentation, geographic 
segmentation, and accounting policy; (2) the average ranking regarding frequency of 
reports, count of disclosed items and consolidation of interim reports; (3) the number of 
analysts following the 30 largest companies in each country; and (4) the average ranking of 
the country’s media development. The measure is from Bushman et al. (2004). 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Appendix A, continued 
Rule of law 
Rule of law, which “captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”. 
The measure is collected from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/WGI/#home  and 
measured at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
Importance of 
equity market 
Importance of equity market, which is measured by a country’s average rank based on: (1) 
the ratio of the aggregate stock market held by minorities to the gross national product; (2) 
the number of listed domestic stocks relative to the population; and, (3) the number of IPOs 
relative to the population. The measure is from Leuz et al. (2004). 
Industry effects  Industry dummies based on Fama and French’s ten industry definitions. 
Year effects Year dummies for the fiscal year. 
Country effects Country dummies based on the firm’s country of domicile. 
pos SUD 
Positive dividend surprise, which is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the actual 
dividend-per-share (DPS) is larger by 1% or more compared to the analyst consensus 
dividend forecast calculated in the last quarter of the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
neg SUD 
Negative dividend surprise, which is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
actual DPS is lower by 1% or more compared to the analyst consensus dividend forecast 
calculated in the last quarter of the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
zero SUD 
Dividends that meet analyst expectations, which is an indicator variable that takes a value 
of 1 if the actual DPS is within 1% caliper of the analyst consensus dividend forecast 
calculated in the last quarter of the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.  
pos SUE 
Positive earnings surprise, which is an indicator variable that takes a the value of 1 if the 
actual earnings-per-share (EPS) is higher by 1% or more than the analyst consensus EPS 
forecast calculated in the last quarter of the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.  
neg SUE 
Negative earnings surprise, which is an indicator variable that takes a the value of 1 if the 
actual EPS is lower by 1% or more than the analyst consensus EPS forecast calculated in 
the last quarter of the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.  
zero SUE 
Earnings that meet analyst expectations, which is an indicator variable that takes a value of 
1 if the actual EPS is within 1% caliper of the analyst consensus EPS forecast calculated in 
the last quarter of the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
pos SUE pos SUD An indicator variable equal to 1 when pos SUE=1 and pos SUD=1, and 0 otherwise.  
pos SUE neg SUD An indicator variable equal to 1 when pos SUE=1 and neg SUD=1, and 0 otherwise. 
neg SUE pos SUD An indicator variable equal to 1 when neg SUE=1 and pos SUD=1, and 0 otherwise. 
neg SUE neg SUD An indicator variable equal to 1 when neg SUE=1 and neg SUD=1, and 0 otherwise.  
CAR 
Three-day cumulative abnormal return centered on the joint preliminary earnings and 
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Figure 1a. Mean quarterly analyst EPS and DPS forecast bias.  
 
 
Figure 1b. Mean quarterly analyst DPS forecast bias split by firms that provide and do not provide dividend 
guidance.  
Fig. 1. Mean analyst dividend and earnings forecast bias by quarter. DPS forecast bias is the difference between the 
actual dividend less the analyst consensus dividend forecast calculated at each fiscal quarter. We scale this 
difference by the share price measured at the end of the previous fiscal year and multiply by −1 so that positive 




























































Fig. 2. The frequency of positive, zero and negative dividend surprises. The figure reports the frequency of dividend 
surprises within a 50 unit range (e.g. a 50 cent range) centered on a zero dividend surprise. The dividend surprise is 
calculated as the difference between the actual dividend-per-share and the analyst consensus dividend forecast 





















































































































Descriptive statistics. Panel A reports the proportion of dividend paying stocks that have analyst coverage and 
dividend forecasts. We also report the proportion of firms that meet or beat the analyst consensus dividend and 
earnings forecast. Panel B reports the proportion of positive, zero and negative dividend surprises conditional on the 
sign of the earnings surprise. Average reports the averages across the sample countries.   
  
# of firm-years 
with analyst 
DPS forecasts 
mean # of 
analysts issuing 
DPS forecasts   
mean # of 
analyst DPS 
forecasts   
% of firms that 
meet or beat the 
consensus DPS 
forecast 
% of firms that 
meet or beat the 
consensus EPS 
forecast 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Austria 91 10.42 20.57 69.3% 49.3% 
Belgium 175 11.96 23.17 56.9% 53.8% 
Denmark 143 10.57 27.19 50.8% 55.6% 
Finland 518 11.72 27.44 61.8% 46.3% 
France 808 14.62 31.66 60.2% 48.5% 
Germany 669 17.03 33.87 56.8% 49.7% 
Italy 232 12.72 24.28 58.5% 37.2% 
Netherlands 277 13.52 29.31 58.3% 48.0% 
Spain 200 16.47 32.07 52.8% 47.2% 
Sweden 490 10.77 24.56 62.7% 46.2% 
Switzerland 352 12.14 28.55 66.8% 55.0% 
United Kingdom 1914 10.64 20.47 73.0% 59.3% 
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Table 1, continued 
  
Sign of the dividend 
surprise 
% of all dividend 
surprises in each 
earnings surprise group 
% of dividend surprises 
within each earnings 
surprise group 
Panel B: Dividend surprises conditional on the sign of the earnings surprise 
pos SUE 
pos SUD  22.5% 52.3% 
zero SUD 7.4% 17.3% 
neg SUD 13.1% 30.5% 
zero SUE 
pos SUD  4.2% 46.3% 
zero SUD 1.9% 21.4% 
neg SUD 2.9% 32.3% 
neg SUE 
pos SUD  19.2% 40.0% 
zero SUD 9.1% 18.9% 
neg SUD 19.7% 41.1% 






Measures of analyst dividend expectations management. The table reports the frequency of significant reductions in 
the optimism of analyst consensus dividend forecast over the course of the fiscal year, significant DPS reduction. 
We also report the proportion of firms that meet the analyst consensus dividend forecast by a small margin, DPS 
barely beat.  The last columns report the proportion of firms that provide managerial guidance, Guidance, and 







Guidance DPS guidance 
Austria 91 65.9% 17.6% 4.4% 4.3% 
Belgium 175 55.4% 10.3% 5.1% 2.3% 
Denmark 143 47.6% 10.5% 2.8% 2.7% 
Finland 518 55.2% 12.0% 0.8% 0.1% 
France 808 54.6% 8.7% 3.8% 2.6% 
Germany 669 55.8% 10.3% 6.4% 2.5% 
Italy 232 49.6% 22.4% 2.2% 1.3% 
Netherlands 277 59.6% 10.5% 7.2% 3.6% 
Spain 200 53.0% 20.0% 1.5% 1.0% 
Sweden 490 59.0% 13.5% 1.4% 1.0% 
Switzerland 352 50.3% 6.3% 1.7% 0.3% 
United Kingdom 1914 59.1% 13.3% 3.0% 1.6% 
Average 
 





Descriptive statistics for regression variables. The table reports the mean, median and standard deviation of the 
control variables from equation (2). Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
Mean Median STD 
Inst Ownership 25.93% 24.96% 13.88% 
Analyst following 17.093 15.167 10.529 
Dispersion 26.87% 4.81% 377.07% 
Total Accruals −0.047 −0.043 0.064 
Earnings STD 3.65% 2.34% 4.80% 
B/M 0.631 0.500 0.678 
MV (Euro million) 4491 1354 9415 
Mom 3.22% 3.14% 19.90% 
ROA 5.76% 5.09% 6.76% 
past payout ratio 47.90% 38.92% 202.69% 
Dividend tax preference 0.930 0.987 0.123 
Loss avoidance 0.438 0.376 0.106 
Earnings smoothing −0.833 −0.831 0.037 
Financial transparency 0.933 0.801 0.362 
Rule of law 1.658 1.719 0.322 





Predicting a significant reduction in the consensus dividend forecast optimism. The table reports regression results 
for equation (2) predicting a significant reduction in the analyst consensus dividend forecast optimism. Detailed 
definitions of variables are in Appendix A. p are the p-values based on dual-clustered standard errors on firm and 
year. ME stands for marginal effects.   
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
  Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. ME p 
Intercept 1.328 0.000 3.377 0.013 3.369   0.013 
Guidance 0.267 0.098 0.287 0.076    
DPS guidance     0.525 6.9% 0.024 
EPS guidance     0.061 0.8% 0.780 
Inst Ownership −0.280 0.238 −0.170 0.475 −0.173 −2.4% 0.466 
Analyst following 0.007 0.153 0.007 0.126 0.007 7.7% 0.128 
Dispersion −0.013 0.630 −0.013 0.634 −0.013 −5.0% 0.634 
Total Accruals 0.711 0.115 0.678 0.133 0.678 4.3% 0.133 
Earnings STD 0.341 0.612 0.344 0.598 0.365 1.8% 0.577 
B/M −0.004 0.928 −0.008 0.865 −0.008 −0.5% 0.873 
ln MV −0.084 0.011 −0.094 0.004 −0.093 −14.7% 0.004 
Mom −0.199 0.197 −0.201 0.192 −0.199 −4.0% 0.197 
ROA −1.971 0.000 −1.964 0.000 −1.946 −13.2% 0.000 
past payout ratio −0.008 0.546 −0.008 0.523 −0.009 −1.7% 0.518 
Dividend tax preference 
  
−0.291 0.350 −1.946 −13.2% 0.000 
Loss avoidance 
  
−0.330 0.324 −0.009 −1.7% 0.518 
Earnings smoothing 
  
2.129 0.096 −0.296 −3.7% 0.343 
Financial transparency 
  
−0.026 0.803 −0.310 −3.3% 0.355 
Rule of law 
  
0.084 0.464 2.164 8.0% 0.090 
Importance of equity market 
 
−0.001 0.851 −0.001 −0.8% 0.859 









































Predicting zero or small positive dividend surprises. The table reports regression results for a logit model predicting 
that the firm will meet or beat the analyst consensus dividend forecast by a small margin. Detailed definitions of 
variables are in Appendix A. p are the p-values based on dual-clustered standard errors on firm and year. ME stands 
for marginal effects.   
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
  Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. ME p 
Intercept 0.422 0.358 3.064 0.210 3.031   0.215 
Guidance 0.533 0.026 0.525 0.028    
DPS guidance 
  
  1.007 13.2% 0.000 
EPS guidance 
  
  −0.081 −1.1% 0.804 
Inst Ownership −0.663 0.087 −0.572 0.135 −0.604 −8.4% 0.116 
Analyst following 0.019 0.028 0.021 0.013 0.021 22.2% 0.013 
Dispersion −8.941 0.000 −8.931 0.000 −8.901 −3357% 0.000 
Total Accruals 1.138 0.156 1.209 0.128 1.238 7.9% 0.120 
Earnings STD 1.548 0.034 1.766 0.014 1.851 8.9% 0.012 
B/M 0.124 0.016 0.111 0.028 0.112 7.6% 0.028 
ln MV −0.244 0.000 −0.266 0.000 −0.266 −41.8% 0.000 
Mom −0.379 0.157 −0.345 0.191 −0.346 −6.9% 0.193 
ROA −3.966 0.000 −4.030 0.000 −4.018 −27.2% 0.000 
past payout ratio −0.063 0.035 −0.063 0.037 −0.063 −12.7% 0.038 
Dividend tax preference 
  
0.562 0.299 0.547 6.8% 0.309 
Loss avoidance 
  
0.841 0.133 0.894 9.5% 0.110 
Earnings smoothing 
  
1.382 0.537 1.449 5.4% 0.518 
Financial transparency 
  
−0.490 0.001 −0.487 −17.7% 0.001 
Rule of law 
  
−0.709 0.000 −0.716 −23.1% 0.000 
Importance of equity market 
  
−0.022 0.012 −0.021 −16.6% 0.014 









































Table 6  
Sensitivity tests: self-selection and endogeneity. Panel A reports results from sensitivity tests where we address the concern selection bias arising from the non-
randomness in analyst stock coverage choices affects our results. Column “2010–2013” reports results for regressions estimated for fiscal years 2010–2013. 
Column “Top IO quintile” reports results for regressions estimated for the quintile of stocks with the highest institutional ownership. Column “Relatively smaller 
firms” reports results for regressions estimated for stocks with relatively smaller size. Firm controls and Country controls are firm and country controls from 
equation (2). Panel B reports results from instrumental variables regressions and logit models with firm effects. Fraction of DPS guidance at the industry is the 
fraction of DPS guidance at the industry level measured over the previous fiscal year. Detailed definitions of other variables are in Appendix A.   
 











 Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p 
Panel A: Robustness tests: addressing self-selection concerns 
Intercept 3.674 0.061 −1.608 0.661 −0.150 0.969 −1.366 0.860 1.843 0.489 12.851 0.022 
DPS guidance 0.449 0.073 0.960 0.002 1.062 0.018 1.334 0.012 0.949 0.100 1.182 0.045 
EPS guidance 0.045 0.857 −0.002 0.995 0.657 0.136 0.805 0.178 0.258 0.573 −0.426 0.414 
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Table 6, continued 









  Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p 
Panel B: Instrumental variables and firm effect regressions 
Intercept −0.022 0.807 2.147 0.010 1.655 0.200 1.073 0.000 0.519 0.149 
Fraction of DPS guidance at the industry 0.990 0.000         
DPS guidance   0.960 0.002 0.803 0.037 0.564 0.011 1.093 0.000 
EPS guidance 0.082 0.011 −0.018 0.900 −0.082 0.643 0.045 0.827 −0.228 0.549 
Inst Ownership 0.007 0.629 −0.127 0.392 −0.374 0.070 0.054 0.798 −1.491 0.000 
Analyst following 0.001 0.016 0.004 0.180 0.010 0.034 0.007 0.136 0.023 0.004 
Dispersion 0.000 0.955 −0.006 0.415 −3.509 0.000 −0.013 0.220 −8.475 0.000 
Total Accruals −0.028 0.308 0.435 0.118 0.743 0.081 0.486 0.300 1.319 0.082 
EPS STD −0.034 0.384 0.241 0.547 1.136 0.010 0.446 0.450 1.934 0.017 
B/M −0.001 0.574 −0.004 0.891 0.054 0.095 −0.010 0.831 0.098 0.077 
ln MV 0.002 0.451 −0.059 0.003 −0.152 0.000 −0.092 0.003 −0.259 0.000 
Mom −0.005 0.446 −0.117 0.221 −0.202 0.145 −0.220 0.153 −0.367 0.132 
ROA −0.022 0.381 −1.193 0.000 −2.215 0.000 −1.794 0.000 −4.339 0.000 
past Payout Ratio 0.000 0.872 −0.005 0.519 −0.032 0.091 −0.007 0.592 −0.058 0.140 
Dividend tax preference 0.006 0.767 −0.203 0.291 0.270 0.348     
Loss avoidance 0.001 0.979 −0.145 0.485 0.542 0.071     
Earnings smoothing 0.010 0.910 1.471 0.062 0.861 0.466     
Financial transparency −0.008 0.443 −0.022 0.744 −0.253 0.001     
Rule of law −0.002 0.758 0.040 0.583 −0.410 0.000     
Importance of equity market 0.000 0.705 −0.001 0.824 −0.011 0.025     
Year effect Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
 
Industry effect Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  
Firm effect No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
 

























Controlling for characteristics of dividend guidance. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the characteristics of 
management dividend guidance. # of management DPS forecasts is the number of management dividend forecasts 
issued during the fiscal year. implied DPS revision is the average percentage difference between the analyst 
consensus dividend forecast and the management dividend guidance where the dividend consensus is measured at 
the time dividend guidance was issued. guidance horizon (months) is the average number of months between the 
fiscal year-end and the dividend guidance issue date. guidance below consensus is the percentage of management 
dividend forecasts issued below the consensus. Panel B reports regressions results predicting a significant reduction 
in the consensus dividend forecast optimism and that the firm will meet or beat the consensus dividend forecast by a 
small margin when we control for characteristics of management guidance. Detailed definitions of other variables 
are in Appendix A. ME stands for marginal effects.   
  Mean Median STD 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics (N=102) 
   
# of management DPS forecasts 1.892 1.000 1.694 
avg implied DPS revision 47.14% 0.00% 491.19% 
avg guidance horizon (months) 7.001 8.000 4.995 
% guidance below consensus 65.56% 100.00% 44.54% 
 
significant DPS reduction DPS_barely_beat 
  Coeff. ME p Coeff. ME p 
Panel B: Regression results 






DPS guidance 0.328 17.88% 0.517 1.783 23.31% 0.003 
EPS guidance 0.031 1.70% 0.888 −0.195 −2.59% 0.590 
# of management DPS forecasts 0.191 10.41% 0.241 0.242 8.06% 0.088 
implied DPS revision 0.080 4.38% 0.186 −3.789 −245% 0.010 
guidance below consensus 0.364 19.87% 0.481 −0.239 −2.48% 0.686 
guidance horizon 0.002 0.09% 0.304 0.006 20.26% 0.024 
Firm controls Yes 
  
Yes 
  Country controls Yes 
  
Yes 
  Year effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  Industry effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  N 5,869 
  
5,869 
  Chi2 79.15 
  
330.02 
  P(Chi2) 0.000 
  
0.000 












Price reactions to joint dividend and earnings announcements. The table reports regression results for equation (3), 
which examines the price reaction at joint dividend and earnings announcements. pos SUE pos SUD is indicator 
variable equal to 1 when pos SUE=1 and pos SUD=1, and 0 otherwise. pos SUE neg SUD is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 when pos SUE=1 and neg SUD=1, and 0 otherwise. neg SUE pos SUD is an indicator variable equal to 1 
when neg SUE=1 and pos SUD=1, and 0 otherwise. neg SUE neg SUD is an indicator variable equal to 1 when neg 
SUE=1 and neg SUD=1, and 0 otherwise. Dividend increase is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the current fiscal-
year dividend is higher than the previous year dividend, and 0 otherwise. Dividend reduction equals 1 when the 
current fiscal-year dividend is higher than the previous year dividend, and 0 otherwise. Firm controls include the 
average forecast horizon of dividend estimates underlying the consensus dividend forecast and firm controls from 
equation (2). Country controls are firm and country controls from equation (2). p are the p-values based on dual-
clustered standard errors on firm and year. ME stands for marginal effects where all variables are standardized to 
have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 
 
  Model (1) Model (2) 
  Coeff. p Coeff. ME p 
Intercept 0.038 0.472 0.057 
 
0.239 
pos SUE pos SUD 0.014 0.000 0.009 6.31% 0.082 
pos SUE neg SUD 0.003 0.283 0.000 0.25% 0.939 
neg SUE pos SUD 0.007 0.005 0.003 1.96% 0.577 
neg SUE neg SUD −0.006 0.072 −0.009 −5.73% 0.100 
Dividend increase 
  
0.004 2.95% 0.140 
Dividend reduction 
  
−0.004 −2.72% 0.276 
pos SUE zero SUD 
  
0.001 0.53% 0.860 
neg SUE zero SUD 
  
−0.006 −2.71% 0.366 
zero SUE pos SUD 
  
0.002 0.69% 0.787 
zero SUE neg SUD 
  
−0.013 −3.75% 0.028 




























R2 3.13%   4.47%     
 
   
 
